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In 1965, as part of his response to a series of 'Charges to the Art Critic' from the 
directors of a seminar in Art Education at Pennsylvania State University, and in 
studied contrast to the growing formalism of the dominant but declining 
modernist criticism of Clement Greenberg and his associates, the North 
American art critic Harold Rosenberg declared:  
'Art criticism today is art history, though not necessarily the art history 
of the art historian'.
i
  
This assertion appears remarkable today, nearly forty years later; and not just 
because of its insistence upon the historical dimension of a practice that has 
become ever more preoccupied with synchronic relations – in particular, 
between art and other cultural forms. It is remarkable because, in asserting the 
independence of the historical dimension of criticism from the discipline of art 
history, it raises the more fundamental issue (which Rosenberg himself made no 
attempt to address) of precisely what kind of art history art criticism is (or should 
be), and what its relations to the art history of the art historian might be. This is a 
question that goes to the heart of thinking about contemporary art, the privileged 
object of art criticism; not least, because it concerns the historical, rather than the 
merely chronological, determination of contemporaneity. 
 In the Euro-American context, art criticism and art history have both 
changed significantly since 1965. There are less grounds for the condescension 
of the critic towards the historian today, more grounds for a reversal of the 
relation. But the question of the specific character of that art history which art 
criticism is, or might be, has not merely remained unanswered, it has become 
obscured from view. Art criticism and art history has each had its own problems 
to deal with. Intellectually serious art criticism – nowadays, for the most part, 
little more than a dream – has fallen prey to a seemingly permanent (or at least, 
constantly renewed) crisis. This crisis is cultural-economic or 'institutional' in 
origin (contingent upon transformations in the social character of art institutions 
during the 1980s and 1990s, and their diminishing need for the mediations of a 
historically oriented criticism), but it is nonetheless intellectual for that. Where it 
thrives as a cultural force, art criticism concentrates on literary aspects of 
journalistic presentation and often treats its object as little more than an occasion 
for communications of a more general kind.
ii
 Meanwhile, art history has been 
transformed as a part of wider changes in the disciplines of the humanities in 
Anglo-American academies, in a manner that Art History exemplifies.  
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Yet successive broadenings of the intellectual scope of the discipline – via 
the new social history of art, feminism, semiotics, psychoanalysis and post-
colonial studies, towards the euphoric horizon of studies in 'visual culture' – have 
not brought it any closer to specifically art-critical forms of judgement; although 
they have produced a network of discursive affinities between the new art 
history and contemporary art itself, at the level of that art's thematic concerns. 
(This is, in part, a result of convergent trends in art-historical and art education). 
Studies in visual culture thus often appear closer to art-critical discourse than 
their art-historical predecessors – indeed, they increasingly occupy what were 
once institutional spaces of criticism – despite their common distance from 
questions of art-judgement. This appearance covers over and hence helps to 
sustain the absence of criticism.
iii
 For the general theories of representation, both 
epistemological and political, which predominate in studies of visual culture – 
usually, if unwittingly, semiotic culturalist variants of the liberal pluralism of US 
political science – are singularly ill-suited to grasping the specific and deeply 
problematic character of the experience of contemporary art. This situation is 
exacerbated, rather than mitigated, by the covert visual essentialism that has 
inadvertently, but inevitably, accompanied the formation of the new proto-
discipline, in an ironic reprise of the terms of its original adversary, formalist 
modernism. For the supplement of 'the visual' restores to cultural analysis an 
aesthetic idealism of vision, at the very historical moment in which art's 
visuality, however pronounced, is perhaps its least distinguishing trait. The 
categorial exclusion of 'aesthetic' from Saussurean semiotics has motivated its 
unreconstructed return, in an antinomic dualism of sign and affect, whereby, 
today, the work of Deleuze functions as an unwitting medium for the restoration 
of traditional aesthetics.
iv
 
When art criticism and art history have come together, most notably in 
recent works by T.J. Clark and Michael Fried,
v
 it has been in order to develop a 
criticism through and within art history – a criticism of now 'historical' art – 
rather than vice versa (that is, to develop the historical aspect of criticism of 
contemporary art, to which Rosenberg was referring). Under these conditions, it 
is useful to approach the questions implicit in Rosenberg's declaration – namely, 
what kind of art history art criticism (ideally) is and what its relations to 'the art 
history of the art historian' might be – from the standpoint of philosophy. For as 
Rosenberg himself suggested, '[b]oth art criticism and art history need to scan 
more thoroughly their philosophical substructures'
vi
 if they are to acquire a more 
adequate sense of their mutual relations. And in fact, surprisingly in many 
respects, there has been a resurgence of interest in explicitly philosophical 
discourses about art over the last decade as part of the recomposition and 
diversification of discourses about art which has accompanied the crisis of 
criticism in its established forms.  
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What follows has three parts: the first is contextual and positional; the 
second is historico-philosophical; the third is art-theoretical. Section One 
considers the character and critical function of the recent revival of interest in 
explicitly philosophical discourses about art. It identifies a central deficiency in 
these discourses – a conflation of art and aesthetic – which, it argues, makes 
them peculiarly unsuited to the comprehension of contemporary art. The second 
section turns to the historico-philosophical roots of the confusion between art 
and aesthetic, in the transition between Kant and Jena Romanticism, in order to 
clarify the differences between the terms. Section Three returns these terms to 
the present, in the presentation of contemporary art as 'post-conceptual' art and 
of Romantic philosophy of art as the conceptual ground for contemporary art 
criticism.  
There is no critically relevant aesthetics of contemporary art, it is argued, 
because contemporary art is not an aesthetic art, in any philosophically 
significant sense of the term. Rather, as a post-conceptual art, contemporary art 
actualizes the idea of the work of art to be found in the Jena Romantic 
philosophy of art, under new historical conditions. The art history that 'art 
criticism [ideally] is' is thus the art history of a historically reflective Romantic 
philosophy of art. This was the legacy bequeathed, in an earlier period, to 
Adorno by Walter Benjamin. It is bequeathed to us today, developed and 
transformed (mediated by the subsequent history of modernism), by Adorno's 
Aesthetic Theory. One task of contemporary criticism is to renew this legacy and 
develop it further, transforming it again, through critical engagement with the 
concrete manifestations of an increasingly transnationalized contemporary, post-
conceptual art.
 
To do so would be to restore to art criticism its central role in 
constituting the history of art; not simply at the level of its canon, but in its 
contribution to the constitution of the historical temporality of art itself.
vii
 
 
1. Art Criticism and Philosophy 
The recent resurgence of interest in explicitly philosophical discourses about art 
has taken place in the context of a crisis of criticism that is part of what Jean-
Marie Schaeffer has described as a wider 'legitimation crisis' in contemporary 
art.
viii
 No doubt, recourse to the established cultural authority of philosophy has 
played a role in its revival in this context. But its intellectual contribution has 
been more than ideological. For contrary to the protestations of Schaeffer's own 
belated positivism, it is perhaps less true now than it has ever been that (in 
Schaeffer's words) 'art itself … will get along very well on its own' – that is, 
without critical discourse. The 'artistic act' may indeed be 'irreducible to the way 
it legitimates itself', but this means neither that it is non-discursive, nor that the 
discourses from which it draws its resources are necessarily non-philosophical.
ix
 
Conceptual art, surely, put paid to any enduring illusions about that – whatever 
else one may think about it. Indeed, it is precisely the acknowledgement of the 
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immanently philosophical character of contemporary art that has led to the 
revival of the claim, by Arthur Danto among others, that art has ended.
x
 Yet this 
claim could be read as little more than an inverted (disavowed) 
acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the prevailing philosophical discourse on 
art (namely, 'aesthetics') to the distinctive character of contemporary art: an 
implicit acknowledgement of inadequacy turned aggressively outwards into a 
judgement against its cause, against the claim of such art to the hallowed 
signifier 'art', in its previously received dominant historico-philosophical sense. 
Hence Danto's coinage of the term 'post-historical' art.  
Schaeffer returns this claim to its original historical context, the early 19
th
 
century, when he argues that what he calls 'the speculative tradition' (which runs 
from Jena Romanticism to Heidegger) misunderstood art from the outset. For 
Schaeffer, the legitimation crisis of contemporary art is the delayed effect of art's 
philosophical sacralization by Romanticism at the end of the 18
th
 century. His 
solution is a philosophical 'de-sacralization' of art, or what we might call 
metaphysical disinvestment. This aetiology is, I think, broadly correct; yet the 
diagnosis and treatment proposed are precisely wrong. For the legitimation crisis 
of art is a sign of the continuing, if problematic criticality of contemporary art. It 
is a sign of the fact that art's authority and critical function remains a problem 
within contemporary culture, a problem for which art's continuing if uncertain 
metaphysical dimension is a conceptual condition. 
Danto and Schaeffer represent alternative variants of one, primarily 
negative way in which philosophy currently contributes to art-critical discourse. 
They are both positivists, of different kinds – a Hegelian positivist and a logical 
positivist, respectively. However, in the wake of Anglo-American art-critical 
enthusiasm for 'post-structuralism' (already a categorial curiosity in a 
philosophical context), there has also been a more affirmative turn towards the 
conceptual resources of the post-Kantian European tradition. In the British 
context, this has been marked by a deepening and increasingly contested 
reception of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory.
xi
 But it is much wider than this and 
includes Heideggerian, Merleau-Pontean and post-phenomenological approaches 
– Lyotard, Derrida and Deleuze, in particular. This has revived interest in the 
place of art within the German idealist philosophies of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries 
– Kant, Hegel and the Romantics, but also Schelling, and to a lesser degree, 
Schopenhauer – which has provided the context of reception for the English-
language edition of Schaeffer's anti-Romantic polemic.  
Now, there is little doubt that the return to this tradition has been, in part, a 
culturally conservative phenomenon: 'against cultural studies' and against certain 
kinds of both 'difficult' and 'popular' contemporary art. But it has also performed 
a critical function by raising theoretical issues associated with the idea of art, in 
its distinction from other cultural forms of representation – issues that are 
literally dissolved by the semiotic reductionism and sociologism of most 
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cultural-theoretical approaches. These are issues that need to be addressed if the 
dearth of theoretically serious critical writing about contemporary art is to be 
overcome. However, and this is my concern here, this turn to the European 
philosophical tradition as a resource for art-critical discourse has as yet failed to 
achieve a convincing theoretical purchase on contemporary art, because it has 
failed to come to terms with the decisive historical transformation in the 
ontology of the artwork represented by this work, changes which are constitutive 
of its very contemporaneity. If one considers the works exhibited at the growing 
number of international biennali, for example, or Documenta – events which in 
large part constitute the extensive definition of contemporary art – one will find 
little that most philosophers who write about art are able to engage with 
concretely, at least, in a manner that also engages, however critically, the 
discourses and concerns of the artworld itself. (Although the growing 
aestheticization of some recent video art is one point of convergence.) Hence the 
reactive, self-justifying and ultimately self-defeating revival of a philosophical 
discourse of the 'end of art', which it is hard to see as much more than a form of 
philosophical réssentiment against art and, ultimately, against contemporaneity 
itself.  
Thus, while these philosophical discourses on art pose a theoretical 
challenge to most contemporary art writing, by raising questions about 
'aesthetic', about judgement, and about the ontology of the artwork, which the 
semiotic discourses of cultural theory are unable to ask, they have largely been 
unable to respond to their own questions other than in terms of the art of the 
past. The most they are able to offer – when not declaring art at an end – is thus 
a conservative recoding of the values of contemporary art. Writings by 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have played a central role here in the last decade 
and have even begun to influence some forms of art production.  
The reason for this, this inability to grasp contemporary art 
philosophically in its contemporaneity and hence its decisive difference from art 
of the past, is, I think, two-fold. First, there is a longstanding confusion (at worst, 
a straightforward identification) between the terms of the two main philosophical 
discourses about art that were established at the end of the 18
th
 century: art as 
'aesthetic' and art as 'ontology' (art as an ontologically distinct object of 
experience – specifically, the site of an autonomous production of meaning and a 
distinctive modality of truth). Second, there is a inability to think the concept of 
art at once philosophically and historically, especially with any kind of futurity.  
The first of these reasons, the conflation of art and aesthetic, so thoroughly 
pervades both philosophical and popular discourses about art that the term 
'aesthetics' (Ästhetik) has long been used, and continues to be used, as the very 
name for the philosophical discourse on art – a practice that was already so 
commonplace in Germany by the 1820s than even Hegel succumbed to it, 
despite his explicit recognition of its inappropriateness, at the beginning of his 
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Lectures on the topic. A further hundred and eighty years of misuse has served 
to bury the slippage almost completely from view.
 xii
 The second reason – the 
inability to think the concept of art at once philosophically and historically with 
any kind of futurity – derives, in part, from the de-historicizing function of 
'aesthetic', and in part from a more general failure to attend to the futural 
performative dimension of the temporal logic of historical totalization, a 
dimension that is inextricable from the critical act of judgement.
xiii
 It is here, in 
the difference between the qualitative historical temporality of critical judgement 
(judgements of art that are at the same time judgements of contemporaneity) and 
the chronological temporality of historicism (comparativism) that we find the 
decisive difference between 'the art history that art criticism (ideally) is' and the 
art history of the (traditional) art historian, for whom the concept of art is not 
itself critically at stake.  
First, though, we need to consider the modern concept of art, in its 
difference from aesthetic, philosophically, as the ground of the fields of art 
criticism and art history alike. To do this, we  need to return to the relationship 
between Kant's thought and that of Jena Romanticism. For it is only a critical 
discourse grounded in an early Romantic philosophy of art (rather than 
Kantianism, Heideggerianism or semiotics), I shall argue, that can get a 
conceptual grasp of contemporary art in its primary historical determination as 
post-conceptual art, an art of the reflective mediation of concepts and affects. 
 2. Art Against Aesthetics (or, Romanticism contra Kant) 
So, what is wrong with thinking about art, philosophically, as 'aesthetic'? What is 
wrong with identifying 'aesthetics' with the philosophy of art? The problem first 
appears, in an exemplary formulation, in the fortieth of Friedrich Schlegel's 
Critical Fragments (1798):  
In the sense in which it has been defined and used in Germany, aesthetic is 
a word which notoriously reveals an equally perfect ignorance of the  
thing and of the language. Why is it still used?
xiv
  
What is this 'equally perfect ignorance' of both the language and the thing?  
Nothing less, it would seem, than that which Kant himself derided in his 
much-quoted footnote to the Transcendental Aesthetic of his Critique of Pure 
Reason (1781): namely, its use by '[t]he Germans … to designate that which 
others call the critique of taste'.  Schlegel's fragment is an ironic citation or re-
writing of this passage. Its reference to 'ignorance of the language' cannot but 
evoke Kant's advice to 'desist' from the use of the word 'aesthetic' to designate 
the critique of taste, in order 'to save it for that doctrine which is true science 
(whereby one would come closer to the language and the sense of the ancients, 
among whom the division of cognition into aisthéta and noéta [things of 
sensibility and things of the mind] was very well known).'
xv
 The doctrine to 
which Kant is referring is his own Transcendental Aesthetic, the first part of the 
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements [of knowledge] in the Critique of Pure 
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Reason, within which the passage in question is located. It is dedicated, not to 
taste, but to the exposition of space and time as pure forms of intuition, 
conditioning the possibility of objects of knowledge in general.  
Schlegel's rewriting is ironic, in part because Kant himself equally 
famously subsequently appeared to go against his own advice when, nine years 
later, in 1790, the first part of his Critique of Judgement-Power, 'Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgement-Power', contained an extensive analysis of aesthetic 
judgements understood as, precisely, judgements of taste. The idea that 
'aesthetics' is a philosophical discourse about art is in large part the fatal legacy 
of the reception of this text, with its apparent confirmation of the legitimacy of 
drawing together the three (originally independent) discourses of beauty, 
sensibility and art into an integral philosophical whole.
xvi
 Schlegel may be read 
as referring his readers back to Kant's earlier text in the context of Kant's own 
apparent subsequent concession to Baumgarten's usage. He is being sarcastic 
about the first Critique, and hence about Kant's self-understanding; at the very 
least, he is drawing attention to Kant's inconsistency or change of mind.
xvii
 
Schlegel is crowing over the triumph of the 'German' use of 'aesthetic' – a 
terminological triumph which, in the Romantic philosophy of art, was in the 
process of becoming a philosophical victory of a different and higher order: a 
triumph of art over philosophy within metaphysics itself. 
However, discursively, this triumph of art within metaphysics is a triumph 
of art criticism over systematic philosophy; it is not a triumph of aesthetic, as 
Kant understood it in Critique of Judgement. In the transition within metaphysics 
from systematic philosophy to Romantic art criticism 'aesthetics' is a vanishing 
mediator. In order to understand the disjunction between aesthetics and art 
criticism that is produced here, it is necessary to examine the apparent 
inconsistency between Kant's two meanings of 'aesthetic' in more detail.  
The inconsistency in question is that between an insistence upon  
restricting the term aesthetic to its 'original' meaning, denoting the sensible 
element in knowledge, and its extended use to refer to judgements of taste. The 
error of the extension, from the standpoint of Kant's first Critique, derives from 
what Kant describes there as the 'failed hope' of 'bringing the critical estimation 
of the beautiful under principles of reason, and elevating its rules to a science'; 
that is, from the aspiration to a rational doctrine of the beautiful, to an 
'aesthetics', in the disciplinary sense. It was this aspiration that led Baumgarten 
to subsume the philosophical treatment of beauty under the sign of a doctrine of 
sensible knowledge. And it is the 'futility' of this aspiration that led Kant to judge 
the usage inappropriate, since, he claimed, 'the putative rules or criteria are 
merely empirical as far as their sources are concerned'. It is not – note – the 
connection between beauty and sensibility to which Kant objects in the Critique 
of Pure Reason, but the idea that the field of their connection (judgements of 
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taste) might be governed by 'a priori rules'.
xviii
 For Kant, then, the term 'aesthetic' 
was from the outset a term of philosophical art, part of the doctrine (Lehre) of 
knowledge. And it is for this reason that it should not have been used to refer to 
taste: not because beauty is not 'sensible', but precisely because of the fact that it 
is, and hence, its judgements are merely empirical. So what led Kant to change 
his mind? 
The fact is that he did not; at least, not on this particular point. For there is 
a rarely acknowledged underlying consistency to Kant's position, despite the 
change in hi usage. When he subsequently himself adopted the supposedly 
inappropriate, extended usage, Kant never went upon his initial reason for 
rejecting Baumgarten's extended use of 'aesthetic'. In Critique of Judgement-
Power, Kant maintains, in fact he emphasizes, this point: 'there is no science 
[Wissenschaft] of the beautiful, but only critique'. He writes it twice: first in 
section 44, 'On Fine Art', and then again in section 60, the Appendix, 'On 
Methodology Concerning Taste', where it becomes more emphatically, 'there 
neither is, nor can be, a science of the beautiful'.
xix
 That is, there neither is, nor 
can be, a philosophical aesthetics. Rather, the change in Kant's position concerns 
a clarification of the methodological status of 'critique'. Critique appears here no 
longer in association with doctrine (Lehre), but as a conceptually self-sufficient 
term, distinct from both 'science' (qua doctrine) and 'the empirical'. 'Criticism of 
taste' is no longer conceived in terms of the application of a priori rules to 
particular cases, or the judgement of such rules by particular cases (Kant's earlier 
focus), but in terms of the immanent notion of transcendental critique which 
governed the project of the Critique of Pure Reason from the outset. It is a part 
of 'critique of reason by reason alone': in this instance, critique of aesthetic 
judgement-power (Urteilskraft) by transcendental reflection; critique of a 
particular power of the faculty of judgement, not criticism of particular 
judgements. Philosophically, where judgements of the beautiful are concerned, 
there is only critique, transcendental critique, of the structure (but not the 
content) of what are always singular (that is, radically empirical) judgements.  
This distinctively Kantian idea of philosophy as a critical standpoint 
beyond positive 'criteria', or positive knowledge, that is nonetheless no longer 
metaphysically self-sufficient as rational doctrine, but purely reflective, was 
crucially formative for Romanticism. It is the other side of the more familiar 
Kantian idea of the 'limits' to reason, which Karl Ameriks has recently 
emphasized as the basis for the construction of a common 'Kantian-Romantic 
position'.
xx
 Famously, the method of immanently transcendental critique allowed 
Kant to stray beyond the cognitive limits of reason, legitimately, as a 'standpoint' 
but never a doctrine. The critique of aesthetic judgement-power concretizes this 
standpoint, subjectively, as the feeling of pleasure accompanying a reflective 
awareness of the unity of subjectivity. It was precisely this 'straying beyond' that 
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the Romantics seized upon and elaborated further, in a new post-critical 
metaphysics of art.  
However, this formal consistency in Kant's position does not appear 
sufficient to meet his own earlier objection to that use of 'aesthetic' which strays 
too far from 'the language and sense of the ancients'. For the standpoint of a 
transcendental critique of the structure of judgement abstracts from all 
concretely sensuous particularity (that is, it conceptualizes sensuous particularity 
in terms of its logical singularity). It is thus not actually 'aesthetic', in Kant's 
original sense of 'things of sensibility'. (The pure forms of intuition, on the other 
hand – space and time – being also 'pure intuitions' are themselves aesthetic.) 
Transcendental critique of taste – as the critique of a specific type of judgement-
power, rather than the critical estimation of sensuous representations – is not 
'aesthetic' in the sense in which the 'things of sensibility' may be distinguished 
from the 'things of the mind'. Rather, it is decisively 'of the mind', or, better, it is 
'of the mind' and 'of sensibility' at the same time: in pure aesthetic judgements of 
taste, the ontological distinction between aisthéta and noéta collapses. 
 This is precisely the point of Kant's transcendental analysis of judgements 
of taste in terms of the reflective relations between cognitive faculties – 
linguistic niceties apart, which at this point begin to appear pedantic and (as 
Hegel treated them) 'a mere name'?
xxi
 Kant's Third Critique transformed the 
meaning of 'aesthetic' by extending it beyond the sensible (spatial and temporal) 
apprehension of the objects of 'outer' and 'inner' intuition to include reference to 
the feelings accompanying the relations of reflection constitutive of the internal 
cognitive structure of subjectivity itself. What is this but a Romanticization of 
aesthetic? Surely the ancient distinction between aisthéta and noéta, to which 
Kant initially appealed, is but the linguistic register of a dualistic rationalism that 
Kant has here, finally, managed to move beyond. Human sensibility is 
irreducibly judgmental and furthermore (contra Aristotle – who thought each 
sense judged discretely) internally relationally so. This is a new philosophical 
account of the ontological specificity of human subjectivity – the main 
philosophical source of the early Heidegger's existentialism, in fact. Kant's 
linguistic innovation – to extend the range of 'aesthetic' to embrace the 
paradoxical pure 'self-affection' of the self-relation of human subjectivity
xxii
 – 
registers this conceptual novelty. Philologically speaking, this is hardly 
'ignorance'. 
But what of 'the thing', critique of taste, as Kant called it, or more simply 
'criticism' as it was known in England at the time, to the objects of which the 
new philosophically extended usage of 'aesthetic' must also refer, since aesthetic 
subjectivity can only feel itself, for Kant, via judgements of taste occasioned by 
objects that 'quicken' it.
xxiii
 This is the point at which the satirical charge of 
'ignorance' begins to acquire a more literal bite. For in Kant's later, dialectically 
ambiguous sense of aesthetic, it is not the extension of sensibility to include the 
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subject's relation to itself – auto-affection – that is the problem, so much as its 
consequent principled indifference to the character of the objects that occasion 
judgement; in particular, its principled indifference to the cognitive, relational, 
historical and world-disclosive dimensions of works of art, which were such a 
central part of 'that which others call the critique of taste'.  
Famously, judgements of art are explicitly excluded by Kant from being 
pure aesthetic judgements of taste. That is, Kant excludes from aesthetics 
precisely those judgements which constitute the main part of the critique of taste, 
historically, as a critical discourse, as an effect of the transcendentalism of his 
method. These are grasped only by Kant's much neglected and under-elaborated 
concept of 'logically conditioned' aesthetic judgements – judgements which, 
operating under the conditions of a determinate concept, such as 'art' or 
'painting', are not aesthetically 'pure'. For Kant, artistic beauty can never be what 
he calls a 'free' or 'purely aesthetic' beauty (at least, not qua artistic beauty), but 
only an 'accessory' or adherent beauty.
xxiv
 This is the conceptual residue of his 
earlier objection to Baumgarten's use of the term 'aesthetic'. There is thus a 
conceptual gap between art and aesthetic which cannot be adeqautely bridged 
within the terms of Kant's thought. Insofar as 'aesthetics' is taken as the name for 
the philosophical treatment of art, we are confronted with a new and equally 
ironic 'ignorance of the thing and of the language': aesthetic's principled 
ignorance of art.
xxv
 For Kant readily acknowledges that 'aesthetic' itself cannot 
distinguish art from nature: art becomes aesthetically pure only when it appears 
'as if it were a product of mere nature'.
xxvi
 Moreover, Kantian aesthetic 
judgement does not reflect on the conditions of this appearing 'as if' – that is, 
upon its ontological and epistemological qualities as illusion; it merely takes it as 
its condition. Kant's restriction of the concept of beautiful or 'fine' art to a type of 
'aesthetic art' (his own term) thus excludes most of what has always been and 
continues to be of most significance about art: the difference from nature marked 
by its metaphysical, cognitive, and politico-ideological functions, qua art.  
The 19
th
 and 20
th
 century tradition of 'art as aesthetic' – artistic 
aestheticism – perpetuated by the very term 'aesthetics', rests upon a false and 
contradictory absolutization of Kant's conception of 'aesthetic art'. Contrary to 
Hegel's acceptance of it as a mere 'name', the term 'aesthetics' functions as much 
more than a name here: it seals and legitimates the exclusion of art's other 
aspects from the philosophical concept of art, reducing it to a single plane of 
significance – namely, its capacity to appear as 'a product of mere nature' and 
hence as the object of pure judgements of taste. Even Kant's account of genius 
(otherwise so productive for a post-Kantian, Romantic aesthetic) is subjected to 
the constraints of this problematic. This ignorance of language – the idea that 
'aesthetics' is an appropriate term to designate the philosophical treatment of art  
– sums up the ignorance of the thing: 'art'. This ignorance persists today in the 
widespread belief that it is the logical autonomy of pure aesthetic judgements of 
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taste from other types of judgement (as theorized by Kant) that is the 
philosophical basis of the autonomy of art. Even writers as sophisticated in their 
reading of German philosophy as Andrew Bowie and Jay Bernstein, for 
example, have contributed to the perpetuation of this myth to the level of a 
philosophical commonplace through their use of the phrase 'aesthetic autonomy' 
to refer to the autonomy of art. Yet Kant's work cannot, in principle, provide the 
conceptual ground for an account of the autonomy of the artwork, since it has no 
account of (nor interest in) the ontological distinctiveness of the work of art. 
That was the contribution of Jena Romanticism.
 xxvii
 
 
 
This is not the occasion for an account of the emergence of the Romantic 
conception of the autonomous artwork out of a displacement of the aporia of 
Fichte's attempt at a foundational philosophy of the subject into the realm of 
poetic meaning. However, with respect to Kant, three things about the Romantic 
theory of art, in particular, should be born in mind: 1) its rejection (or what 
August Schlegel called its 'denunciation') of the distinction between free and 
accessory beauty, 'as invalid and as springing from too narrow and too low an 
assessment of the beautiful';
xxviii
 2) its abolition of the categorial separation of the 
beautiful and the sublime (prefigured in Kant's own notion of aesthetic ideas); 3) 
its elaboration of a metaphysically invested conception of art – as, in Schelling's 
words, the 'organon of philosophy'
xxix
 – at a concrete-historical level, not as a 
medium-based system of the arts, but as a philosophically constructed (negative) 
theory of genres, in an ongoing mediation of the categories of the philosophy of 
art with the history of art. This third feature is the mediating core of the 
Romantic philosophy of art, through which it acquires its distinctive 
philosophical shape of being at once transcendental, metaphysical and (unlike 
its Heideggerian version) concretely historical: an historical-ontological theory 
of art.
xxx
 In this respect, the Romantic categories of poetry and the novel, as 
absolute genres 'forever becoming', have a similar philosophical status to what 
Thierry de Duve calls 'generic' art, and as what I am calling post-conceptual 
art.
xxxi
  
As the product of the displacement of the structure of an seemingly 
irresolvable metaphysical problem (the infinite reflexivity of a self-positing 
subject) into a special kind of object (art), the autonomous work of art is as 
irreducibly conceptual – and metaphysical – in its philosophical structure as it is 
historical and 'aesthetic' in its mode of appearance. It is thus a mistake to 
suppose that because it is conceptual, there is no role for 'aesthetic' within it. Far 
from it. As the registration of the necessary sensuousness of presentation, 
aesthetic is ineliminable from the early Romantics' ontological conception of art. 
It is, however, ontologically both partial and relational. The artistic significance 
of aesthetic must be judged here in the context of the historically shifting 
relations between aesthetic and other – cognitive, semantic, social, political and 
ideological – aspects of artworks. And the balance and meaning will be different 
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in different kinds of art. Furthermore, these relations between the aesthetic and 
other aspects of artworks derive their critical meaning from their relations to the 
equally historically variable aesthetic dimension of other (non-art) cultural 
forms: predominantly, but by no means exclusively, commodity design and 
display, advertising, mass media and communications technologies – the whole 
non-art aspect of the apparatus of visual culture. One problem with the 
philosophical discourse of 'art as aesthetic' is that it mitigates against recognition 
of these relations as being internal to the critical structure of the artwork, and 
hence against the understanding of contemporary art in certain of its most 
significant, historical and anti-aesthetic aspects. 
In the light of this brief reconstruction of the philosophical pre-history, we 
can discern two parallel and competing, though to some extent also overlapping, 
traditions in the criticism of art since the end of the 18
th
 century corresponding to 
the two philosophical discourses of 'art as aesthetic' and 'art as (historical) 
ontology'. The first runs from Kant through 19
th
 century aestheticism 
(Baudelaire, Pater, Wilde), via Fry and Bell, to Greenberg's later writings (which 
mark the aestheticist collapse of his earlier historical self-understanding). It rests 
upon an aesthetic theory of the arts, with its distant origins in Renaissance 
naturalism and the new science of optics
xxxii
 and its mainstream in an empirical 
reduction of Kant's transcendentalism to a psychology – at best, a 
phenomenology – of perception, of which Wollheim was the contemporary 
master.
xxxiii
 The second tradition runs from philosophical Romanticism through 
Hegel, Duchamp, surrealism and the revolutionary Romanticism of 
constructivism, to conceptual art and its consequences in what Rosalind Krauss 
calls the 'post-medium condition', and which I prefer to think of as the 
transmedia condition of post-conceptual art.  
The first (aesthetic) tradition finds its concrete critical terms in an 
aesthetic theory of medium that dates back to Lessing. It is currently being 
revived in a more explicitly Kantian, transcendental variant by Jay Bernstein, as 
the philosophical basis for a theory of modernism as the cultural representation 
of nature's resistance to history – a reading which combines Greenberg with 
Adorno, via an immanent critique of T.J. Clarke's interpretation of Jackson 
Pollock.
xxxiv
 The second (historical-ontological) tradition finds its critical terms 
in a philosophically negative theory of the 'truth of art' which manifests this 
negativity historically in the concept of 'the new' – an avant-gardist constitutive 
negation that determines artistic meaning as a determination of contemporaneity 
itself. It thus derives its content empirically within a historically open, but 
nonetheless speculatively totalizing, generic conception of art, within which the 
historical present is necessarily privileged as the standpoint of a future-oriented 
(negative) totalization. The qualitative historical temporality of art-critical 
judgement appears here as a consequence of the philosophical dynamics of 
historical totalization per se. This second Romantic or generic avant-gardist 
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tradition has developed in active relation to both historical transformations in the 
institutional conditions of artistic autonomy (which establish the social 
conditions of possibility of autonomous meaning production) and socially 
progressive political cultures which have criticised the prevailing social forms of 
autonomy, and in particular, their misrecognition as 'aesthetic'. Its current 
representative is the anti-aestheticism of post-conceptual art. 
But what exactly is post-conceptual art? In what sense does it determine the 
contemporaneity of 'contemporary art'? And what does this equivalence between 
'post-conceptual' art and 'contemporary' art, if such it is, tell us about 'the art 
history that art criticism is' (or should be)? – to return to the terms of 
Rosenberg's declaration from which I set out.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3. Post-Conceptual Art 
It has become conventional to periodize the art of the last fifty years in terms of 
a transition from 'modernism' to 'postmodernism' – however vaguely or 
varyingly the second of these two terms is understood in this context. 
(Greenberg's critical hegemony has tended to fix the meaning of the first term, 
albeit in a conceptually and chronologically restrictive manner, and thereby to 
open up the artistic field of the 'postmodern' as the space of its abstract 
negation.) The problem with this periodization, however, is that it fails to endow 
the complexly interacting set of anti-'modernist' artistic strategies of the 1960s 
with either sufficient conceptual determinacy and distinctness or adequate 
historical effectivity. In particular, it fails to register both the critical priority of 
conceptual art within this field
xxxv
 and the historical and critical significance of 
its 'post-conceptual' legacy. It thus fails to provide a theoretical basis on which 
we might specify the ontological distinctiveness of contemporary art. I therefore 
propose an alternative periodization of art after modernism that privileges the 
sequence modernism/conceptual art/post-conceptual art over the 
modernist/postmodernist couplet, and treats the conceptual/post-conceptual 
trajectory as the standpoint from which to totalize the wide array of other anti-
'modernist' movements – where 'modernism' is used here in its restrictive and 
ultimately mystifying, but nonetheless still critically 'actual', Greenbergian sense. 
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(A philosophically adequate conception of modernism as a temporal logic of 
cultural forms would embrace the whole sequence; 'postmodernism' being the 
misrecognition of a particular stage in the dialectic of modernisms.)  
By 'post-conceptual' art I understand an art premised on the complex 
historical experience and critical legacy of conceptual art. Post-conceptual art is 
a critical category that is constituted at the level of the historical ontology of the 
artwork; it is not a traditional art-historical or art-critical concept at the level of 
either medium, form or style. Rather, as the critical register of the historical 
destruction of the ontological significance of such categories, it provides new 
interpretative conditions for analyses of individual works. The critical legacy of 
conceptual art consists in the combination of four main insights, which 
collectively make up the condition of possibility of a post-conceptual art. These 
are:  
1. the ineliminability but radical insufficiency of the aesthetic dimension 
of the artwork; 
2. the necessary conceptuality of the artwork; 
3. the critical requirement of the anti-aesthetic use of aesthetic materials; 
4. the radically distributive character of the unity of the artwork across 
the totality of its material instantiations (and the historical malleability of the 
empirical borders of this totality). 
1. The principle of the ineliminability of the aesthetic dimension of the 
artwork is the product of the so-called 'failure' of Conceptual art: that is, the 
failure of its strong, 'pure' or analytical programme, the idea of a 'purely' 
conceptual art associated for a brief period (1968–1972) with both Joseph 
Kosuth and Art & Language – although there are important differences between 
the critical positions of these artists. What 'failure' means here is the practical 
demonstration of the incoherence of a particular self-understanding of 
'conceptual art'. This was not an artistic failure. Indeed, it was a perverse artistic 
success. It was the ironic historical achievement of the strong programme of 
'analytical' or 'pure' conceptual art to have demonstrated the ineliminability of 
the aesthetic as a necessary, though radically insufficient, component of the 
artwork through the failure of its attempt at its elimination, the failure of an 
absolute anti-aesthetic. (In this sense, it was indeed a repetition of Duchamp: a 
repetition of the necessary erosion of 'aesthetic indifference'.) This experimental 
programme thereby fulfilled the classically Hegelian function of exceeding a 
limit in its established form (the aesthetic) in such a way as to render it visible 
and thereby reinstitute it on new grounds.
xxxvi
 In this respect, the meaning of 
'conceptual art' must be retrospectively critically refigured to incorporate this 
insight. In its strongest sense, of a 'purely' conceptual or analytical art, 
conceptual art was an idea that marked a particular anti-aesthetic desire.  
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2. At the same time, however, in demonstrating the radical insufficiency 
or minimal conditionality of the aesthetic dimension of the artwork to its status 
as art, conceptual art was able to bring once again to light, in a more decisive 
way, the necessary conceptuality of the work, which had been buried by the 
aesthetic ideology of formalist modernism – a conceptuality which is historically 
central to the allegorical function of art. Conceptual art demonstrated in a whole 
variety of novel ways, with respect to a whole series of different forms of 
materiality, the sense in which 'aesthetic' in both its ancient and Kantian senses 
(as sensibility and as pure reflective judgement) is a part of yet utterly fails to 
account for the ontological specificity of 'art'. The aesthetic concept of art 
mistakes one of many conditions for the whole. It mistakes art's necessary 
aesthetic appearance for the ground of its autonomous, and hence infinite, 
production of meaning, which is in fact historically relational, rather than 
'positive' (that is, given) in any aesthetic sense. Conceptual art demonstrated the 
radical emptiness or blankness of the aesthetic in itself, as an ontological 
support, that derives its meaning, in each instance, relationally or contextually, 
whatever its precise form of materiality – and this includes those instances when 
it functions as a negation, as well as a carrier, of meaning.  
3. Having exposed the aesthetic misrecognition of the artwork as an 
ideological fraud it thereby established the need for art actively to counter 
aesthetic misrecognition within the work, through the constructive or strategic 
aesthetic use of aesthetic materials. The victory of the 'aesthetic remainder' over 
strong conceptualism (that is, conceptual art's own inevitable pictorialism) was 
thus ultimately a Pyhric one. This Pyhric victory – and the transition to a post-
conceptual art that it represents – was staged by Art & Language themselves in 
their paintings and installations of the 1980s and 1990s [figs 1–3]. It accounts for 
the privileged status of photographic practice within contemporary art, with its 
necessarily strategic pictorialism. [figs 4 & 5].  
4. Finally, in its informality, its infinite proliferation of forms of artistic 
materials (its principled destruction of an ontological conception of 'medium') 
and its inclusion of both preparatory and subsequent, documentary materials 
within its conception of the work, conceptual art demonstrated the radically 
distributive character of the unity of the work. That is to say, each work is 
distributed across a potentially infinite, but nonetheless conceptually defined, 
and in practice finite, totality of spatio-temporal site of instantiation.
xxxvii
 
Methodologically, one might say that the reason for the critical priority of 
conceptual art within the field of anti-modernist practices of the 1960s, is that it 
was the art that raised the retrospective search for the universal determinations of 
'art' to the highest theoretical power by its negative totalization of the previous 
set of practices, to produce a new (negative) artistic absolute, which functions as 
the enabling condition of a new set of practices: post-conceptual art. As Adorno 
recognized, it is only retrospectively that the concept of art acquires any kind of 
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unity, and this unity is therefore 'not abstract', but 'presupposes concrete 
analyses, [n]ot as proofs and examples but as its own condition.' The idea of art 
is given through each work, but no individual work is adequate to this idea. 
Furthermore, this ongoing retrospective and reflective totalization is also 
necessarily open, fractured and inherently historically speculative: 
 The definition of art is at every point indicated by what art once was, but it 
is legitimated only by what art became with regard to what it wants to be, 
and perhaps can, become. … Because art is what it has become, its 
concept refers to what it does not contain. … Art can [thus] be understood 
only by its laws of movement, not according to any set of invariants. It is 
defined by its relation to what it is not … Art acquires its specificity by 
separating itself from what it developed out of; its law of movement is its 
law of form.
 xxxviii
 
It is the historical movement of conceptual art from the idea of an absolute 
anti-aesthetic to the recognition of its own inevitable pictorialism that makes it a 
privileged mediating form; that makes it, in fact, the art in relation to which 
contestation over the meanings and possibilities of contemporary art is to be 
fought out. Indeed, if my claim for the critical-historical priority of conceptual 
art can be sustained, it is only in relation to the category of conceptual art, in its 
inherent problematicity, that a critical historical experience of contemporary art 
is possible. In this respect, 'post-conceptual art' is not the name for a particular 
type of art, so much as the historical-ontological condition for the production of 
contemporary art in general – art, that is, that can sustain the signifers 'art' and 
'contemporary' in their deepest theoretical senses.  
The reason that the idea of post-conceptual art may be said to determine 
the contemporaneity of 'contemporary art' is that it condenses and reflects the 
historical experience of conceptual art in relation to current art practices. As 
such, it requires a reflective totality of lower-level critical categories for its more 
concrete comprehension. The construction of such a reflective totality of 
categories is the task of criticism. The meaning of these categories, however, 
ultimately derives from their contribution to the (future-oriented) retrospective 
totalization of which they are a part. This contribution defines the form of 'the art 
history that art criticism (ideally) is' as an art history of the qualitative historical 
temporality of the new. 'The art history that art criticism (ideally) is' is a 
modernist art history of the qualitatively historically new, of the qualitative 
historical novelty of the present, from the standpoint of which the past is to be 
reconstructed and make legible.  
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